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1

ARGUMENT
As discussed in Rappleye's opening appeal brief (and discussed herein), the trial
court erred in its decision because (1) Johnson's claims of fraudulent transfer and
constructive trust are barred by the statute of limitations, and (2) the trial court had no
jurisdiction in the garnishment proceeding to adjudicate Hodges' assets when she was not a
party to said proceeding.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING TO
APPLY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO JOHNSON'S CLAIMS
A,

A Fundamental Flaw Permeating Johnson's Appeal Brief Regarding
the Statute of Limitations Issue Is That Most of the Facts, Claims and
Arguments Therein Are Irrelevant

Rappleye's statute of limitations defense is very narrow and specific. It is simply
that the September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed (see. Appendix A) from Rappleye "was or
could reasonably have been discovered"1 by Johnson at or before the February 1996
bankruptcy trial.2 In support of this legal conclusion, Rappleye presented the undisputed
excerpt from Rappleye's bankruptcy trial (which is quoted on pgs. 17-18 in Rappleye's

1

Utah's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, U.C.A. § 25-6-10(1) ("UFTA").

2

It is undisputed that this deed is the fraudulent transfer Johnson requested the trial
court to void and unwind. Once this transfer was unwound, the trial court concluded that
Rappleye had 48% interest in the proceeds Hodges received from her sale of the Resort. It
is these proceeds that ended up in her Fidelity Investment account, which Johnson attached.
1

Brief of Appellant).3
Although Johnson briefly discusses this discrete issue, she also presents the Court
with pages and pages of irrelevant facts, claims and arguments of Rappleye's supposed
misrepresentations and concealment of his other assets in an effort to engender sympathy
from the Court and to inject emotion and passion into the few legal issues on appeal.4 For

3

For the Court's convenience, the excerpt in question is attached to this brief as
Appendix B.
4

Typical jury instructions mandate that the trier of fact conscientiously and
dispassionately consider and weigh the evidence and apply the law of the case. For
example, MUJI 2.3 states, "This case must not be decided for or against anyone because
you feel sorry for anyone or angry at anyone. It is your sworn duty to decide this case
based on the facts and the law, without regard to sympathy, passion or prejudice." Surely
the same applies to judges as well as juries.
In the same vein, the Utah Supreme Court in Donohue v. Intermountain Health Care.
748 P.2d 1067, 1068 (Utah 1987) stated that, "We have previously held that 'pleas plainly
designed to elicit sympathy or to inspire passion or prejudice should not be allowed."5
(Citation omitted). See also, State v. Truiiilo. 214 P.2d 626, 645 (Utah 1950) (holding that
it "is the duty of the court to apply the law to the facts supported by the evidence"). Other
jurisdictions have also articulated a judge's duty to dispassionately apply the law. In
Commonwealth v. O'Neal 339 N.E.2d 676, 693 (Mass. 1975), the court held:
No judge should ever be concerned with whether his decision will be popular or
unpopular. He does his job always with complete awareness that. . . contemporary
public emotions (no matter what their motivation), and personal philosophies are
completely foreign and irrelevant to the exercise of his judicial power. This is the
very essence of judicial duty — no less should be given and no more should be required.
Finally, in United Traction Co. v. Monohan, 190 N.Y.S. 425, 426 (1921), the court held that
"judges of the courts are chosen to deal dispassionately with all parties and to enforce the
law with even-handed justice, protecting the rights of all under the law, the popular and the
unpopular."
2

example, Johnson asserts facts about a partnership between Rappleye and Hodges, Rappleye
concealing the Timpanogos Property, Rappleye and Hodges' temple marriage, Rappleye's
letter of objection to the bankruptcy court, findings and conclusions of the bankruptcy
court, Hodges' estate planning matters, Hodges and Rappleye's marital relationship, and
their motor home and Suzuki Sidekick. Such facts might be used at trial as a strategy to
engender sympathy from a jury for her cause, but said facts are simply irrelevant for the
Court to determine if the September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed was a fraudulent transfer.
Put another way, if Johnson initially discovered the September 17, 1993 Quit Claim
Deed, or could have reasonably discovered it, do such "badges of fraud" still stick to
Rappleye? Such "badges of fraud" cannot erase or invalidate the fact that by the time of the
February 1996 bankruptcy trial, Johnson had actually discovered (or could have reasonably
discovered) the fraudulent transfer - the September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed. Once she
discovered the Quit Claim Deed, the statute of limitations began running at that time.5 It
did not stop running thereafter based on a new badge of fraud, and Johnson has presented
the Court with no legal support allowing a court to toll the running of the statute of
limitations after it had already started.
Thus, once the Court wades through Johnson's sympathy-engendering fraud facts,
5

See e ^ Aragon v. Clover Club Foods Company. 857 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah App.
1993) (holding that "the running of the statute of limitation is tolled until the plaintiff
discovers (or should have discovered) all of the facts that form the basis for the cause of
action."
3

and focuses on the core statute of limitations issue - i.e. Johnson's discovery of the
September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed - the Court will find that all else is irrelevant,
extraneous, and included in the Brief of Appellee to prejudice the Court against Rappleye.
B.

The Trial Court Erred in Concluding that Rappleye Fraudulently
Concealed the September 17,1993 Quit Claim Deed6
1.

The Core Issue Regarding Rappleye's Statute of Limitations
Defense is Whether Johnson Discovered Facts of the September
17,1993 Quit Claim Deed Based on the Bankruptcy Excerpt

The trial court found that Johnson proved fraudulent concealment.7 The trial court,
however, did not specify that Johnson proved fraudulent concealment vis-a-vis the
September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed. As stated above, proof of Rappleye fraudulently
concealing anything else is wholly irrelevant to Johnson's fraudulent transfer claim. Thus,
the core issue to Rappleye's statute of limitations defense is: did Johnson discover, or
could she have discovered, facts regarding the September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed
based on the bankruptcy excerpt?
This narrowly-defined issue is shaped by Utah caselaw. First, the Court of Appeal
must look solely at the September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed because it is the undisputed

6

Based on the Court of Appeals' recent decision in Russell/Packard Development
Inc. v. Carson, 78 P.3d 616 (Utah App. 2003), a discussion of the fraudulent concealment
doctrine is appropriate in deciding this case.
7

Notably, the trial court has made no finding of fraudulent misrepresentation,
fraudulent nondisclosure, or constructive fraud. Indeed, the claim at issue is one of
fraudulent transfer (and the other issue is Johnson's constructive trust claim which is
discussed below).
4
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that, " T h e means of knowledge is equivalent to knowledge. A party who has opportunity of
knowing the facts constituting the alleged fraud cannot be inactive and afterwards allege a

8

I his Court just decided Russell/Packard less than four months ago (on September
18, 21303) - - approximately one month after R appleye filed his Brief of Appellant.
5

want of knowledge that arose by reason of his own laches and negligence.'" Id. at 1196
(citation omitted) (emphasis added). And in United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park
City Co., 870 P.2d 880 (Utah 1993), the court held, '"All that is required [to trigger the
statute of limitations] is . . . sufficient information to apprise [the plaintiffs of the
underlying cause of action] so as to put them on notice to make further inquiry if they
harbor doubts or questions' about the defendant's actions." LI at 889 (citation omitted)
(emphasis added). "Under the concealment prong, . . . [t]he limitations period is postponed
only by belated discovery of key facts and not by delayed discovery of legal theories."
Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 579 (Utah App. 1996) (emphasis
added). Finally, "it is not necessary for a claimant to know every fact about his fraud claim
before the statute begins to run." Baldwin, 850 P.2d at 1197. Thus, according to the above
cases, Johnson has discovered the September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed when she
demonstrates "a knowledge of the facts," "has an opportunity of knowing the facts
constituting the alleged fraud," or has sufficient information of the underlying cause of
action.
2.

Applying the Above Caselaw to the Facts Surrounding the
September 17,1993 Quit Claim Deed Yields No Fraudulent
Concealment

Johnson clearly had "a knowledge of the facts" or an "opportunity of knowing the
facts" that constituted the "wrong" based on the 1996 bankruptcy trial excerpt (reprinted in

6

Appendix B) w herein Johnson's attorney cross-exai nined R apple}/ e (with leading questions)
about the specific owners of the Resort prior to Hodges (see. Appendix C), and the specific
owners of the Resort who purchased it from Hodges. (See, Appendix D). As argued in the
Brief of Appellant, there is no reasonai'-v < .
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to obtain H o d g e s ' deeds, one of which was the September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed
whereby Rappleye transferred his interest in \l\: Koso-* to Hodges. 9

claiming that the excerpt in question "reveals only that Plaintiffs attorney knew the name
of the person who sold the Branson Property to Hodges and the person to w h o m Hodges
later sold ' II: ic exchai ige in no « ; • ay reveals 1 IOV or fi om j < 1 ic i n, Plai ntiff s attorney learned
that information." (See, Brief of Appellee, pg, 27) (emphasis in original). How evei,
Johnson offers the Court no alternative explanation as to how her attorney mysteriously
knew- the chain of title of the resoi t tlii ough three coi lseci iti ve o > > i i "i s (i e Di i\ all IV lichel
Investments (Duvall) to Hodges, and from Hodges to the Smiths). (See Appendices B and
9

The other Hodges' deed is a Statutory Warranty Deed reflecting her changed name
after her divorce from Rappleye. (See, Appendix E).
7

D, respectfully). Even the trial court (after listening to the tape containing the excerpt in
question, which Rappleye intends to play at oral arguments for this Court) acknowledged
that Johnson "had copies of the deeds for sure" at or before the bankruptcy trial. (R at
1451, pg. 151:9-10).10
Johnson further attempts to distance herself from the bankruptcy excerpt by
claiming that the excerpt fails to show Johnson "knew that i) Rappleye purchased Branson
Property with Hodges; ii) that Rappleye had held title in the Branson Property jointly with
Hodges; and/or iii) that Rappleye transferred his interest in the Branson Property to
Hodges on September 17, 1993." (See, Brief of Johnson, pg. 27). However, this argument
ignores the logical and reasonable conclusion that if Johnson had the January 4, 1993
Warranty Deed by Corporation from Duvall to Hodges (see. Appendix B), she must have
noticed that said deed transfers title of the Resort from Duvall to Hodges and "G. Bryce
Rappleye." Surely, the sight of Rappleye's name on a quit claim deed recorded on the
Resort should have been a fact sufficient enough to require Johnson to conduct further
inquiry into Rappleye's interest in the Resort. Further, the deed transferring interest from
Hodges to the Smiths makes no mention of Rappleye's name. (See, Appendix D). This
fact, in conjunction with the Duvall-to-Hodges/Rappleye warranty deed (see. Appendix C),

10

This acknowledgment of course did not become a finding because counsel for
Johnson drafted the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and the trial court
signed off on them all without change, over Rappleye's objections.
8

should have at the very least excited Johnson's interest to find out the status of Rappleye's
interest in the Resort, especially when she had a judgment of over $200,000 she had been
trying to collect from Rappleye for almost two years, during which time Rappleye is
claiming he has no assets. Again, Johnson need only have "a knowledge of facts which
would have put an ordinarily prudent man upon inquiry which, if followed up, would have
resulted in a discovery of the fraud," or in other words "sufficient information" to apprise
Johnson of Rappleye's fraudulent transfer. Thus, the bankruptcy excerpt conclusively
demonstrates that Johnson knew of the September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed - the
undisputed fraudulent transfer - or, at the very least, could have known about said quit claim
deed.
3.

Johnson Has Alleged No Facts That Rappleye Fraudulently
Concealed the September 17,1993 Quit Claim Deed

Finally, Johnson provides the Court no facts of affirmative steps that Rappleye
made to conceal the September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed. It is undisputed that said quit
claim deed was publicly recorded. It is undisputed that said quit claim deed contains no
aliases or fabricated names or corporate names so as to hide Rappleye's true name.
Johnson has made no allegations to the contrary. Thus, Rappleye's fraudulent transfer was
transparent for all to see via the recorded September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed which
Johnson discovered or could have discovered according to the bankruptcy excerpt in
question.
9

Contrast Johnson's allegations of fraudulent concealment of the September 17,
1993 Quit Claim Deed with McConkie v. Hartman, 529 P.2d 801 (Utah 1974) where the
plaintiff claimed the defendant fraudulently concealed a mineral reservation of rights
clause in certain recorded deeds of trust regarding property plaintiff purchased from
defendant, thereby tolling the statute of limitations. In affirming the trial court, the
McConkie court explained:
The court below found that the plaintiffs had full opportunity to discover the
reservations in the deeds when the deeds were delivered to Security Title Company
and when they reviewed problems in the chain of title. That all of the
circumstances existing at or about the time the deeds were recorded were such
as to furnish full opportunity to the plaintiffs for the discovery of the mistake or
fraud, if any existed. The court further found that more than eight years had elapsed
since the time for reasonable inquiry on the part of the plaintiffs would have
revealed the mistake or fraud to the time of filing their complaint. The trial court
concluded that the claims of the plaintiffs are barred by the statutes of limitation
above referred to.
Id. at 802 (emphasis added). Furthermore, Freitag v. McGhie, 947 P.2d 1186 (Wash.
1997) provides another example of a debtor claiming fraudulent concealment of a deed: "In
this case, for instance, nothing on the instrument itself indicated a fraudulent transfer. . . .
This transfer was to an insider, a family member, but the names were not the same and
there was no indication of this relationship" Id. at 1190. In Freitag, the debtor gave a
note to his aunt (with a different last name than debtor) as well as a deed of trust securing
the note to his aunt that encumbered debtor's property, creating the facade that no equity
existed in debtor's property for the creditor. IdL at 1187. The creditor later discovered the
10

relationship of the debtor to the trust deed holder (his aunt) and filed a successful
fraudulent transfer action thereafter. LI
In sum, based on the above facts (i.e. the bankruptcy court excerpt) applied to the
above caselaw, Johnson discovered (or could have discovered) the September 17, 1993
Quit Claim Deed thereby triggering the statute of limitations on her fraudulent transfer
claim. Thus, this Court should follow the Utah Supreme Court's conclusion in Baldwin:
"Lacking allegations that the debtor had concealed the deed effecting the fraudulent
conveyance, we held [in Baldwin] that the creditors were on constructive notice of the
conveyance, and therefor its fraudulent nature, because 'the means of knowledge were
available' to the creditors." Berenda, 914 P.2d at 52 (citation omitted). The same exact
result should apply to this appeal.11
4.

Johnson Should Have Searched for Property Upon Which to
Execute Once She Obtained the Judgment From Her Divorce
Action With Rappleye

Not to be lost among Rappleye's statute of limitation's defense is the related
defense that once Johnson obtained her 1994 judgment against Rappleye (in their divorce
proceeding), as a matter of law, she should have searched for property of Rappleye's upon
which to execute her judgment. As the court in Baldwin held:

11

Based on the above discussion, Johnson's common law two-pronged analysis (i.e.
[1] prove fraudulent concealment, and then [2] prove Johnson acted reasonable) fails on its
first prong.
11

After obtaining the judgment against Willard Wood, the Burtons should have
searched for property upon which to levy. . . . Had a search been made,
exercising reasonable diligence and proper prudence, it surely would have
uncovered the transfer from Wood to his wife. Discovery of the transfer would
then have sparked further inquiry on the part of the Burtons. If such inquiry had been
pursued, the Burtons would have discovered facts surrounding the allegedly
fraudulent conveyance. At the very least, discovery of the transfer should have
incited suspicion of fraud.
Baldwin, 850 P.2d at 1197 (emphasis added). Likewise, the Berenda court explained:
[In Baldwin] [wje held that the creditors would have discovered the conveyance
had they conducted a normal search of property upon which to levy when they
received their judgment against the debtor. [Citation omitted]. Lacking
allegations that the debtor had concealed the deed effecting the fraudulent
conveyance, we held that the creditors were on constructive notice of the
conveyance, and therefore its fraudulent nature, because Hhe means of
knowledge were available9 to the creditors.
Berenda, 914 P.2d at 52 (emphasis added). In sum, Johnson's fraudulent transfer claim is
barred by the statute of limitations which began running at the time Johnson received a
judgment against Rappleye in the Spring of 1994. At that time, she was on constructive
notice to search for properly Rappleye owned upon which to levy her judgment. Johnson
does not dispute this defense as it appears she did not address it in her Brief of Appellee.
Accordingly, the trial court committed reversible error by failing to dismiss Johnson's
claim pursuant to this defense.
C.

Johnson's Constructive Trust Claim is Also Barred by the Statute of
Limitations

As a back-up to her fraudulent transfer claim, Johnson also asserts a constructive

12

trust claim. Although the trial court did not rule on this claim, it nevertheless fails for the
same statute of limitations reason as Johnson's fraudulent transfer claim (as set forth in
Rappleye's introductory Brief of Appellant).12
Johnson counters this argument with Nielsen v. Nielsen, WL 33249399 (Utah App.).
Although Nielsen is distinguishable insofar as the Nielsen court tolled the statute of
limitations because the Nielsen defendant failed to present any evidence to indicate the
plaintiff had actual or constructive notice (i<l at 4), Nielsen is nevertheless a decision
without a published opinion. Rule 4-508(1) of the Rules of Judicial Administration states
that, "Unpublished opinions, orders and judgments have no precedential value and shall not
be cited or used in the courts of this state,.. ." Thus Nielsen has no precedential value.
In sum, Johnson's constructive trust claim is barred by the statute of limitations
because Johnson discovered the September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed, or could have
discovered it, no later than the February 1996 bankruptcy trial.
II.

JOHNSON'S PROCEDURAL ARGUMENTS ARE WITHOUT MERIT
Johnson includes two procedural arguments in her Brief of Appellee: (1) Rappleye

should have ordered a complete transcript, but didn't, and (2) Rappleye failed to marshal the
facts on appeal. As discussed below, both of these arguments are without merit.

12

In other words, Johnson probably had actual notice of the September 17, 1993
Quit Claim Deed, but certainly had constructive notice of said deed.
13

A.

Requesting the December 11, 2001 Hearing Transcript Was
Unnecessary Because it Contains No Evidence Relevant to the
September 17, 2003 Quit Claim Deed (Statute of Limitations Defense)
and No Evidence Relevant to Rappleye's Jurisdiction Defense

Johnson claims that Rappleye failed to file a statement of issues which is required
under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure when only a partial transcript is
requested. Johnson implies that Rappleye's submission of the transcript of only the March
6, 2002 evidentiary hearing and not the December 12, 2001 hearing somehow omits
evidence relevant to the findings or conclusions Rappleye challenges.13 However, not only
does Johnson fail to state what evidence from the December 12, 2001 hearing she feels is
relevant (in fact none of the exhibits attached to the Brief of Appellee were introduced as
an exhibit at the December hearing), but she fails to state either how she is prejudiced by
Rappleye ordering only a partial transcript (i.e. the transcript of the March 6, 2002
hearing), and also fails to state the evidence from the December 12th hearing that is relevant
to the September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed (or relevant to Rappleye5s jurisdiction
defense). As this Court stated in Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah App.
1989), Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure directs counsel to provide the
appellate courts with all evidence relevant to the issues raised on appeal. No relevant
evidence was submitted at the December 12, 2001 hearing (at least that was not considered
again at the March 6,2002 hearing).
13

The March 6, 2002 hearing was a continuance of the December 12, 2001 hearing.
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Further, Rappleye included in his Docketing Statement all the relevant issues to be
considered in this appeal.
Finally, Rappleye stipulated with Johnson to give Johnson whatever time she needed
to insert into the record on appeal whatever parts of the December 12, 2001 hearing. (See,
Motion to Supplemental Record on Appeal and Stay the Briefing and Deadlines). Thus,
Johnson certainly was not prejudiced, and because anything Johnson may have included in
the record from the December 12, 2001 hearing is irrelevant to the issues in this appeal,
the Court already has all the evidence in front of it to reverse the trial court below.
Thus, this procedural argument by Johnson is without merit.
B.

Rappleye Marshaled All Evidence Relevant to the September 17,1993
Quit Claim Deed

Johnson's other procedural argument is that Rappleye supposedly failed to properly
marshal evidence in support of the trial court's findings vis-a-vis his statute of limitations
defense. In support of this claim, Johnson points this Court to five groups of facts that
Rappleye supposedly failed to marshal.
1.

Facts Related to the Purchase of the Bronson Property (i.e.
Resort)

First, Johnson claims Rappleye should have marshaled facts related to the closing of
the Branson Property (i.e. the Resort), including Rappleye's execution of the Real Estate
Purchase Contract and the HUD Settlement Statement, and Rappleye's transfer of
$144,000. (See, Brief of Appellee, pg. 39). However, Rappleye's execution of said
15

contract, the HUD statement, and the $144,000 are irrelevant to whether Johnson
discovered, or could have discovered, the September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed. In other
words, said evidence is irrelevant to Rappleye's statute of limitations defense and lack of
jurisdiction defense. Not only is Rappleye not appealing those findings, but for purposes
of this appeal, Rappleye does not dispute that he executed said contract and the HUD
statement, and transferred $144,000 to purchase the Resort.
2.

Facts Related to the Time Line From June 15, 1993 to January 6,
1994

Second, Johnson claims Rappleye should have marshaled facts related to the
Rappleye v. Rappleye appeal, the dates of Rappleye's and Hodges' divorce, remand trial
and various hearings, as well as the Timpanogos Property transfer. (See, Brief of Appellee,
pg. 39). Again, these findings are irrelevant to whether Johnson discovered, or could have
discovered, the September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed. In other words, said evidence is
irrelevant to Rappleye's statute of limitations defense and lack of jurisdiction defense. Not
only is Rappleye not appealing those findings, but for purposes of this appeal, Rappleye
does not dispute them.
3.

Facts Related to Rappleye's and Hodges' Divorce

Third, Johnson claims Rappleye should have marshaled facts related to his and
Hodges' divorce. Such facts, however, are irrelevant to whether Johnson did or could have
discovered the September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed. In other words, sadd evidence is
16

irrelevant to Rappleye's statute of limitations defense and lack of jurisdiction defense. Not
only is Rappleye not appealing those findings, but for purposes of this appeal, Rappleye
does not dispute them.
4.

Facts Related to Rappleye's Prior Sworn Testimony and
Representations to Various Courts

Fourth, Johnson claims Rappleye should have marshaled facts related to sworn
testimony and representations Rappleye introduced to the trial court back in 1994
regarding his divorce from Johnson, as well as the bankruptcy court. Such facts, however,
are irrelevant as to whether Johnson discovered, or could have discovered, the September
17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed. In other words, said evidence is irrelevant to Rappleye's statute
of limitations defense and lack of jurisdiction defense. Not only is Rappleye not appealing
those findings, but for purposes of this appeal, Rappleye does not dispute them.
5.

Facts Related to the 2001 Supplemental Proceeding, Writ of
Execution, Motor Home and Suzuki Sidekick

Perhaps most indicative of Johnson's overreaching on her procedural claim that
Rappleye failed to marshal facts is her assertion that events in 2001 are somehow relevant
to whether Johnson discovered, or could have discovered, the September 17, 1993 Quit
Claim Deed. It cannot be disputed that such evidence is wholly irrelevant to Rappleye's
statute of limitations defense and lack of jurisdiction defense. In fact, such evidence is
only brought before this Court to engender prejudice against Rappleye. In any event, not
only is Rappleye not appealing those findings, but for purposes of this appeal, Rappleye
17

does not dispute them.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADJUDICATING HODGES5 FIDELITY
ACCOUNTS BECAUSE IT HAD NO JURISDICTION BECAUSE HODGES
WAS NOT A PARTY TO THE ATTACHMENT PROCEEDING
Johnson initially refutes Rappleye's jurisdiction defense by claiming that because

Rappleye's arguments are unsupported, they are not sufficiently briefed. In support of this
claim, Johnson relies on State of Utah v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145 (Utah App. 1997), State v
Bishop. 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1998) and Burns v. Summerhavs. 927 P.2d 197 (Utah App.
1996). These cases, however, are clearly distinguishable.14 Further, Rappleye argued the
merits of his jurisdiction defense in detail and with citations to the record in his Brief of
Appellant. Accordingly, there is no legal basis for the Court to completely dismiss his
jurisdiction defense without deciding said defense on the merits.
Johnson further opposes Rappleye's jurisdiction defense (i.e. that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction over Hodges because she was not a party to the attachment proceeding
below) by pointing to Hodges' involvement in said proceeding. Johnson attempts to

14

The Montoya court was faced with an inadequately briefed issue raised for the
first time on appeal. Montoya, 937 P.2d at 150. The Bishop court was faced with an issue
briefed by defendant "in a footnote." Bishop, 753 P.2d at 450. And, the Bums court was
concerned with an appeal that did "not contain citations to the record showing that each of
the issues he has raised was preserved for appeal in the trial court," that failed "to indicate
the standard of review for each of the issues," failed to "provide any argument on [one]
issue," and "[i]n his entire brief, Lawrence cites to only one authority, the Comment to Rule
1.13 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and the "Scope" of these Rules, to support his
assertions." Burns, 927 P.2d at 199.
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discount the undisputed fact that Hodges was not a named party by claiming that Hodges sat
at Rappleye's table during the March 6, 2002 attachment hearing, helped with exhibits at
said hearing and testified at said hearing. Johnson even claims that the testimony of
Hodges' son at the March 6th hearing somehow makes her a party. Notably, Johnson
provides the Court no caselaw that appearing and testifying at a spouse's legal proceeding is
equivalent to being a party to the same proceeding.
To the contrary, Utah courts have required one to be a party if they are to be bound
by a court's order. In Ostler v. Buhler. 989 P.2d 1073, 1076 (Utah 1999), the court held
that, '"A decree in favor of a person who is not a party to the action or proceeding is void
because the court has no jurisdiction to make it.'" (Citation omitted). In Snelson v.
Pickard, 56 P. 89 (Utah 1899), the trial court ordered the defendant to turn over certain
stock to a referee, in satisfaction of plaintiff s demand. Pursuant to an agreement of the
parties, the defendant subsequently delivered said stock to plaintiffs attorney who disposed
of the same. Thereafter defendant demanded the stock of the attorney, who refused to
cooperate. The defendant then obtained an order to show cause against the attorney, but on
appeal the Snelson court invalidated said order, holding that the attorney could not be held
amenable to the trial court's order because the attorney was not a party. Li at 90. The
defendant's only remedy against the attorney was a separate action for damages. IdL
Accordingly, just because Hodges attended the various legal proceedings against
Rappleye and provided testimony at said proceeding, the trial court does not somehow
19

obtain jurisdiction over her. She must be a party to establish jurisdiction. Thus, the trial
court committed reversible error in adjudicating her assets in the Fidelity Investment
accounts in the attachment proceeding below.
VI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CALCULATION OF RAPPLEYE'S
PERCENTAGE OF THE PROCEEDS FROM THE SALE OF THE RESORT
Alternatively, should the Court enforce the trial court's judgment, the Court should

correct the trial court's incorrect calculation of the sale proceeds from the Resort
attributable to Rappleye.
The trial court awarded Johnson 48.39 % of the $330,000 purchase price of the
Resort. However, the trial court arrived at the 48.39% by dividing Rappleye's $144,000
contribution by the $297,579.79 wired to purchase the Resort. As stated earlier, Johnson
has provided no evidence that the $32,500 difference between the wired amount and the
purchase amount was paid by Rappleye. It is certainly Johnson's burden to prove that the
$32,500 came from Rappleye as it is her claim to prove her damages. In the Brief of
Appellee, she states without citation to the record that:
The evidence presented to the Trial Court showed that Rappleye and Hodges made
every attempt to equally share the costs associated with the purchase of the Branson
Property. It is certainly reasonable to assume that the additional amount of
approximately $32,500 was also equally shared by Rappleye and Hodges.
Imputing half of the remaining $32,500 to Rappleye is pure speculation, which should not
be the basis of a court's damage award. Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, 808 P.2d 1069,
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1079 (Utah 1991) (holding, "there still must be evidence that rises above speculation and
provides a reasonable, even though not necessarily precise, estimate of damages.").
Accordingly, the trial court committed reversible error in calculating the percent of
the $330,000 Resort purchase price that is attributable to Rappleye.
CONCLUSION
Based on the forgoing, the Court should reverse the trial court's conclusion that
there was no fraudulent transfer and overturn any findings in support of said conclusion.
The Court should base such a reversal on the statute of limitations or on jurisdictional
grounds. Any of the trial court's findings of fact that conflict with such a conclusion of law
(which are noted in the Statement of Facts section in the Brief of Appellant) are clearly
erroneous.
Finally, and in the alternative to a reversal of the trial court's decision, the Court
should modify the trial court's incorrectly calculated judgment amount.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

u

day of January, 2004.

HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C.

\Sjephen Quesenberry
'T^Bryan Quesenberry
Attorneys for Rappleye
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following:
Matt C. Osborne
Osborne & Barnhill, P.C.
11576 South State, Building 101
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Facsimile
Mailed (postage prepaid)
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January 4, 1993 Duvall-to-Hodges/Rappleye
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* These deeds were admitted into evidence collectively as "Exhibit 5" at the March 6, 2002
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QUIT CLAIM DEED

Hl'll

W/*/i Statutory

a s , ^

Acknowledgment

THIS INDENTURE, Made on t h e . J 2 t h . - d a y of

September

One Thousand Nine Hundred a n d . . n i n e t ^ j - J ± r e e .

A D

by and b e t w e e n . i ^ o r ^ e _ £ r x c e

_Rappleye a - a_roarried_perspn_

of the County of

Taney

t

j

n

the State of Missouri, part_y_

of the first part, and

j

J^^^^J^^n^^^l^Y^j^^-^^FJ^^^I^I^PIl
of -the County of

!F^F^L

, in the State of Missouri, part^i.

WITNESSETH, That the said part.y

of the second part

of the first part in consideration of the sum of

J![*QD§-§5£-2j^§^^

DO'LLARS
I

to.-hilU

paid by the part_y.

,

of the second part, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged,

do^s
by these presents Remise, Release and forever Quit Claim unto the said party
of the
second part the following described lot, tracts, or parcels of land, lying, being and situate in the County of
Taney
t a n c j State of Missouri, to-wit*

A l l o f L o t s One ( 1 ) , Two ( 2 ) , Three ( 3 ) , and Four (4) i n Block F i f t y - o n e ( 5 1 ) , and
L o t s T h r e e (3) and Four (4) i n Block F o r t y - s i x ( 4 6 ) , and Lots Ten (10) and E l e v e n
(11) i n Block F o r t y - o n e (41) a l l i n Rockaway Beach, a s p e r t h e r e c o r d e d P l a t t h e r e o f
f i l e d i n t h e O f f i c e of t h e Recorder o f Deeds, Taney County, M i s s o u r i T h i s Q u i t Claim Deed i s b e i n g r e - r e c o r d e d
was i n a d v e r t e n t l y d e l e t e d from Quit Claim
and Page 1207-1208.
Also:
A l l o f Lot Ten (10) i n Block F o r t y
M i s s o u r i a s p e r t h e r e c o r d e d p l a t thereof,

t o add t h e f o l l o w i n g l e g a l d e s c r i p t i o n which
Deed r e c o r d e d October 4 , 1993, i n Book 322
(40) i n t h e S u b d i v i s i o n o f Rockaway Beach,
Records o f Taney County, M i s s o u r i .

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the same with all rights, immunities, privileges and appurtenances thereto belonging unto the said party

of the second part and

ever, so that neither the said party
or persons for«him

or in

of the first part nor
his

hex

heirs and assigns for- \

his

name

heirs, nor any other person

demand any right or title to the aforesaid premises or any part thereof, but they, and every one of them shall
by these presents be excluded and forever barred.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said party
hand

and seal

of the first part ha-S— - - ^ - hereunto-set—bis

the day and year first above written. ^

S.gned, Sealed o^§fyKge

/ /

g^nce of

I ,

s,

C$%ggM^^

jLi^rj:c--.j^.ii_r_T:
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(SEAL)
(SEAL)
(SEAL)

STATE OF MISSOURI,
County of
1
On this

)
! ss>

day of

to me known to be the person
acknowledged that

f i w i ^ i i - henrAkuo i ^ i / u m i f i i i ^ k i » . *
SINGLE PERSON'S ACKNOWLEDGMENT
, 19

The said

before me personally appeared

described in and who executed

executed the same as

the foregoing

instrument,

and

free act and deed

further declared

to be single and unmarried

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal,
at my office in
My term of office as a Notary Public will expire
(SEAL)

|

or behalf, shall or will hereafter claim or t

the day and year first above written.
, 19
Notary Public

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B
Mr. Checkett:15
Rappleye:
Mr. Checkett:
Rappleye:
Mr. Checkett:
Rappleye:
Mr. Checkett:
Rappleye:

So, for the last three years or so, have you ever lived in the
Branson area?
In the Branson area, yes.
OK, where did you live?
Rockaway Beach
Alright, who did you live with in Rockaway Beach?
Well, I was married and lived in Rockaway Beach.
And who was your spouse?
Jean Rappleye [i.e. Hodges]

* * *

Mr. Checkett:
Rappleye:
Mr. Checkett:
Rappleye:

And is it true that Jean had a resort in Rockaway Beach?
Yes.
And you stayed at the Resort with Jean?
Yes.

* * *

Mr. Checkett:
Rappleye:
Mr. Checkett:
Rappleye:

And Jean recently sold that Resort. Did she not?
I think she has.
Did you have any money invested in the resort?
I didn't have any interest in the resort.

* * *

Mr. Checkett:
Rappleye:
Mr. Checkett:
Rappleye:
Mr. Checkett:
Rappleye:

Now, were you married to Jean when she acquired that resort?
yes.
And who did she buy it from?
Uh, I'm trying to think of the name.
Well, does Duvall Michel Investments ring a bell?
yes.

* * *

Mr. Checkett:
Rappleye:

15

And do you know the people the resort was recently sold
to? . . . Does Emery or Sonya Smith ring a bell?
Hum. It seems like that it was.

Mr. Checkett was Johnson's attorney at the February 1996 bankruptcy trial.
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Thii instrument i s prepared byt
Linda Jean Rappleye
P.O. Box 86
Rockawuy Beach, Hisuouri 65740
(417) 561-4135

Thio apace reserved for use
by Clerk of Court:

STATUTORY WARRANTY DEED
X, Limla Jean Rappleye, whose post office address is P.O. Box B6,
Rockaway Beach, Missouri 65740, hereinafter referred to as "th* Grantor",
for good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is acknowledged,
hereby grant, bargain, M i l , and convey to^Linda Hodgea, whose poat office
address la P.O. Box 66, Rockaway Beach, Missouri 65740, hereinafter
referred to as "the Grantee*" and the helra, assigns and successors of the
Grantee foraver, all right, title interest, estate, lien/ claim, equity,
and demand of the Grantor in and to the real property in Taney County,
Miaaouri, described as:

ALL Or LOTS ONE (1), TWO (2), THREE (3), AND FOUR (4) IN BLOCK
F1FTY-ONE (51), AND LOTS THREE (3) AND FOUR (4) IN BLOCK
FORTY-SIX (46), AND LOTS TEN (10) AND ELEVEN (11) IN BLOCK
FORTY-ONE (41), LOT TEN (10) IN BLOCK F0R7Y (40) XN THE SUBDIVISION OF ROCKAWAY BEACH, MISSOURI AS PER THE RECORDED PLAT
THEREOF, RECORDS OF TANEY COUNTY, MISSOURI.

SUBJECT TO EASEMENTS AND RESTRICTIONS Or RECORD, IF ANY.

The Grantor fully warrants the title to the above-described property
and will defend the same against the lawful claims of all persons
whomsoever«
This Statutory warranty Deed is signed by the Grantor in the Presence
of the witnesses of the JT* day of
WITNESSES:
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GRANTOR:
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L i n d a / J e a n Rappleycr '

/

Brandy/tU Nichols
Brandy/O.
0TJUT CHF MISSOURI
Cdl/NT*..t)P/JTANEY

f ™ i J ^ ^ g p i n g inatrument was acknowladgad before me on the i_day or
/v;&tc*Bfefy c l£s3, by Linda Jean Rappleye, who personally appeared before m,
i X ^ VAnnuii^rtA.i hhat *h».« executed the same as her free a c t and deed:

